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Based on a 6 equation model by Haldane and Battini (1999), we estimated a Phillips and
an IS equations for Brazil after the Real Plan, in order to study the transmission
mechanism of the monetary policy. The results show that interest rate affects output gap
with a lag of one quarter and output is positively related to inflation with a one lag only.
The devaluation of the nominal exchange rate has also a contemporaneous effect on
inflation. We also made stochastic simulations in order to depict the inflation and output
gap volatility loci under alternative Taylor-type rules and under an optimal rule, which
minimizes a loss function that depends on a weighted average of inflation and output
gap variances. The stochastic simulation showed that when compared to the variance in
inflation, output gap variance appears to be more sensitive to the weights given in the
loss function. It also showed that optimization procedures longer than 6 periods are
inefficient and the most efficient frontier horizons are set within the range of 2 to 4
periods. Finally, sub-optimal but simple rules, like Taylor type rules can perform as well
as the optimal ones, depending on the parameters chosen and on the preferences of the
Central Bank.
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Brazil adopted a formal inflation-targeting regime in June 1999, six months after the
switch in the exchange rate regime to a floating system
2. The main feature of the new
monetary policy is to look at (expected) future inflation to decide the current interest
rate.  The underlying idea is to have an anticipative stance in order to consider the lag
effects of interest rate on inflation through the aggregate demand transmission
mechanism
3.
Many Central Banks that adopted this new framework in the nineties were able to
control inflation with more transparency and credibility than before. As the name
suggests, under an inflation-targeting regime, the Central Bank main objective is to keep
inflation within a predefined band. This contrasts with other nominal anchors, like
exchange rate and monetary targets. Although there is a theoretical support for a
relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation, empirical evidence shows that
such relationships are not stable.
Among other papers on inflation targeting models and alternative interest rate rules we
focus on  three: Haldane and Battini (1999) Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) and
Taylor (1999). Haldane and Battini (1999) emphasize the importance of a forward-
looking interest rate rule, which performs almost as good as an optimal rule, even if the
output variable is not directly included in the loss function to be minimized. The authors
summarize in a 6 equation model the most important features of the inflation target
framework.
Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) analyse four  models and compare a wide set of
policy rules to conclude that:
                                                
2 England and Sweden are examples of countries that also introduced inflation targeting systems after a
change in the exchange rate regime. Inflation targeting is also used in New Zealand, Australia, Chile,
Israel and Spain.
3 References about the transmission mechanism include King (1997), Ball (1999) and Svenson (1998) .6
“even in large models with hundreds of state variables, three variables (the current
output gap, a moving average of current and lagged inflation rates, and lagged
‘interest rates’) summarize nearly all the information relevant to setting the
‘interest rate’ efficiently.” (page 31).
Taylor (1999) summarizes the common features of the models that deal with inflation
targeting. All of them are stochastic, dynamic and economy-wide. He also pointed out
that:
“even the larger models can be described conceptually as “three relationship”
system.(one relationship being the policy rule). Equation relating consumption,
investment and net exports to interest rate and the exchange rate combine to form
an IS block of equation; wage and price setting with exchange rate pass through
combine to form a price adjustment block of equation.”
Taylor (1999) concludes  there is no significant improvement on the results when
substituting a simple policy rule for a complex one.  In addition complex policy rule that
incorporate inertial factors are more dependent on rational expectation assumptions.
The main objective of this paper is to estimate an IS and a Phillips equations for Brazil
in order to simulate the effects of different interest rate rules on the variance of inflation
and output gap. The benchmark is the optimal interest rate rule, obtained by minimizing
a loss function, which is a weighted average of the variance of inflation and output gap.
The next section presents the Haldane-Battini model and the structure of the IS and
Phillips equations. Section 3 contains the estimations of the 2 equations, section 4
shows the results of the stochastic simulations for optimal and alternative Taylor-type
rules. The last section presents the conclusive remarks. The stochastic simulation
showed that when compared to the variance in inflation, output gap variance is more
sensitive to the weights given in the loss function. It also showed that optimization
procedures longer than 6 periods are inefficient and the most efficient frontier horizons
are between 2 and 4 periods. Finally, sub-optimal but simple rules, like Taylor type7
rules can perform as well as the optimal ones, depending on the parameters chosen and
on the weights given in the loss function. This is a similar result to the one found in
Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) and is good news in the sense that the monetary
authority may be able to adopt simpler rules with few consequences in terms of
generating excessive output and inflation volatility.
$PRGHOIRUWKHWUDQVPLVVLRQPHFKDQLVPXVLQJRXWSXWJDS
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As a starting point we used a small, open-economy, log-linear rational expectations
macro-model found in Haldane and Battini (1999), which has 6 equations:
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Equation (1)is a usual IS curve, where the output gap depends negatively on the real
interest rate and positively on the real exchange rate. Equation (2) is a regular LM
curve, in which money demand depends on nominal interest rate and output. Equation
(3) is an uncovered interest parity, that does not included a risk premium variable.
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 Equation (4) and (5) are the supply side. Equation (4) is a mark-up over weighted
average contract wages. Equation (5) is a wage contracting equation. The lag/lead
weights sum up to one to generate a vertical log-run Phillips curve. The output gap also
is included in this equation.
Equation (6) is consumption price index, depending on the domestic goods and
imported goods.
After some manipulation in (4)–(6), the authors come with a reduced-form  Phillips
curve of the model:
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where ct is the real exchange rate. There is a term for the output gap (which is the most
important to explain the interest rate transmission mechanism), and the weighted
backward and forward-looking inflation terms represent the inflation persistence. The
last two terms are the exchange rate pass-through.
7ZR(TXDWLRQ0RGHO
This paper is going to work with an even simpler model, with three equations: an IS
curve, a Phillips curve; and an equation for nominal exchange rate:
Equation (8) is an open economy IS curve, where output gap (y – y*) depends on its
own lags, on the lagged real interest rate (r), on the lagged real exchange rate first
difference (Dc), on the lagged fiscal deficit (p) and on a demand shock (e).
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Equation (9) is an open economy Phillips curve. Inflation (p) depends on a lag of itself,
on a lag of output gap, on a change in the nominal exchange rate (De) and on a shock
(h). The exchange rate affects inflation directly through the price of imports and
indirectly thorough its effects on the output gap.
Equation (10) is the exchange rate determination, which is assumed to follow a random
walk.
In this model, the transmission mechanism from interest rate to inflation occurs only
through the aggregate demand channel, and it takes two periods for interest rate changes
to affect inflation.  Observe that modeling exchange rate through a random walk
precludes the often-mentioned exchange rate channel, where its appreciation follows
increases in interest rates via UIP. Despite the theoretical appealing of modeling
exchange rate through UIP, predictions of future exchange rate using a random walk
specification usually outperforms the predictions based on UIP
4.
Given equations (8)-(10), the Central Bank chooses interest rate at each period  and
such decision will affect inflation from two periods ahead on. It is therefore necessary to
specify the Monetary Authority decision mechanism. Among others, Taylor type rules
and optimal rules are the most popular ones.
Taylor rules are simple ones, where the interest rate is set as a linear function of to the
current behavior of two variables: the wedge between observed inflation and the target
and the output gap. Such rules can also be extended including other variables, like
exchange rate or past interest rate, as well as using expected variables instead of
observed ones.
                                                
4 See, for example, Wadhwani (1999).10
Optimal rules are ones were the interest rate is the solution of a minimization of a loss
function subject to some constraints that should characterize the transmission
mechanism. For example, the Central bank chooses the real interest rate that minimize
the following loss function:
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s.t. equations (8) - (10).
This is a typical problem in the literature of inflation targeting
5, where l is the weight
the Central Bank places on the variance of inflation, d is the discount factor, y is output
and y* is potential output.
(VWLPDWLRQV
The estimation used quarterly data and the variables are expressed in their logarithms.
Inflation is measured by the general price index IGP-DI/FGV. The output proxy is
GDP, and the gap is estimated by GDP minus potential output. The estimation of the
potential output is a difficult and controversial task and we used the Hodrick-Prescott
filter. The nominal exchange rate is the period average of the ask prices, and the
nominal interest rate is the Selic rate, the equivalent to US Fed funds rate. The fiscal
variable chosen is the federal government primary deficit, measured as percentage of
the GDP. The real interest rate was calculated by deflating the nominal interest rate by
the IGP-DI. In order to obtain the real exchange rate, the nominal one was multiplied by
the American producer price index and divided by the IGP-DI.
                                                
5 See, for instance, Svensson (1995 ) and Svensson (1997/98).11
The sample period ranged from 1992:4 to 1999:1 to estimate the IS equation and ranged
from 1995:1 to 1999:2 to estimate the Phillips curve. We decided to restrict the data
range for the Phillips equation, restricting the sample after the Real Plan in order to
avoid high inflation contamination in the coefficients.
The choice to use quarterly data for such a short sample period poses the problem of too
few degrees of freedom. On the other hand, quarterly data are less noisy than monthly
ones. Besides, the transmission mechanism should take at least 2 quarters to occur.
Consequently it would not be feasible to work with monthly data to forecast inflation
one or two years ahead, as it is needed in an inflation target framework, since the
standard errors of the forecasts would become very large. Finally, despite the few
degrees of freedom, most of the estimated coefficients turned out to be statistically
significant.
The equations were estimated using OLS. The IS curve does not contains a real
exchange rate term neither a fiscal term in the present specification. But all the others
term are very significant and with the expected sign. The real interest rate was included
with 1 lag. A lag of the output gap, a pulse dummy for the Real plan and a dummy for
the third quarter of 1998  were also included as explanatory variables. Equation (12)
shows the coefficients and their respective t-statistics.
N=29  R-squared =0.79  F-statistic = 22.8
The Phillips equation was estimated with one lagged term for inflation. The output gap
entered the equation with one lag, and the devaluation of the nominal exchange rate
seems to be contemporaneous, with a pass-through of 20%.
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Equation (13) shows the coefficients and their respective t-statistics.
N = 18  R-Squared = 0.72  F-statistic = 12,31
We are imposing a long-run vertically in the Phillips equation, restricting to 1 the sum
of the coefficients of lagged inflation and of nominal exchange rate variation. What
means that any devaluation in the exchange rate will be completely passed through
prices in the long run. Although we did not impose the restriction of no constant when
estimating the parameters, this term was dropped in the simulations presented below.
The effect of interest rate on inflation is indirect and takes two periods to occur. So, the
control lag is two quarters. A one percentage point increase in the real interest rate will
affect negatively the output gap in 0,39 percentage point. Given that a decrease of 1
percentage point in the output gap reduces inflation by 0,31 percentage point, the final
effect of the increase of 1 percentage point in interest rate will be a reduction of 0,12
percentage point in inflation in the short run. In the long run, taking into consideration
the auto-regressive coefficients, the final effect would be a reduction in inflation of 0.6
pp.
In both equations we test the residuals for auto correlation. The correlograms do not
show evidence of this problem. The test of the cross-correlation of the two equations
residuals was also done and the result shows no evidence of that.
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subject to (8) –(10), ie, the IS, Phillips and exchange rate equations, and to:
it = it+1 = it+2 = …. = it+n-1 = i       (i)
where l is the weight the Central Bank gives to inflation variance compared to output
gap variance. When the value of l is 0, the optimal rule puts all weight on the output.
Conversely, when l=1 means the Central Bank cares only about inflation variance.
Restriction (i) is equivalent to assume that, when setting interest rates at W, the Central
Bank commits to keep the interest rate unchanged between period W and t+T-1.  Observe
that this procedure may be considered a myopic optimization problem because it only
takes into account expected inflation and output gap T periods ahead, ignoring the
effects of interest rate on inflation and output gap from period T1 on. The use of such
myopic approach, though, simplifies considerably the solution. Besides, we calculated
optimal interest rates with T ranging from 2 to 8 periods and it could be concluded that
it was inefficient for the Central Bank to take into consideration more than 6 quarters in
the loss function.
The optimal interest rate is given by
7:
                                                
6 Strella and Michkin (data) shows that if model parameters are uncorrelated with interest rate, the
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where  W W K
~ ~
and p  are the components of inflation and output gap that do not depend on
current and future interest rates.
From (14) one can see that, in order to calculate the optimal interest rate, it is necessary




E and ,  7 L£ . The appendix shows that these variables
depend on the realizations of p and h at time W, on the interest rate path from W to WL
and on expected exchange rate variation from W to WL. At time W, only pt and ht are
known. The interest rate path is the outcome of the optimization procedure. Therefore, it
is still necessary to define the exchange rate variations path. This path was constructed
assuming exchange rate follows a random walk. As explained before, a drawback of this
hypothesis is the lack of response of exchange rate to interest rate decisions. However,
an adequate way to incorporate such responses is beyond the scope of this paper and
other simpler responses, like the widely used uncovered interest rate parity condition,
may yield a worse fit than random walk.
Given the interest rate rule, a stochastic simulation was made in order to build an
efficient frontier, showing the output gap and inflation variance for different values of l
and different time horizons. The result is shown in Chart 1 and will be commented
below. The first step is to generate a series of simulated inflation and output. At period
1, both inflation and output gap are known and the Central Bank is assumed to choose
an interest rate according to the optimization problem. At period 2, shocks on inflation,
output gap and exchange rate hit the economy and a new interest rate is set. The errors
are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and diagonal covariance matrix.
The variances of inflation and output gap are the ones obtained in the regressions.15
Concerning the shock on exchange rate, it was imputed a standard deviation of 5%. This
imputation was necessary because there were only two observations in the sample with
a floating exchange rate regime. This procedure was repeated for 200 periods and the
efficient frontier corresponded to the variance of inflation and output gap obtained in
this simulation from period 50 on.
Chart 1 presents the trade-off between inflation and GDP output that is behind the
selection of a specific l and optimization periods. Along each line, the optimization
period is held constant and l varies from 1 (all weight given to inflation variance) to 0
(all weight given to output gap variance). For low values of l, optimization taking into
account only 2 periods ahead is the most efficient while for higher values of l (ie,
higher weight to inflation variance), the efficient frontier refers to optimization
procedures with horizons of 3 and 4 quarters.
This result was to some extent surprising. It was already expected that for very short
time horizons and high weight on inflation, output variance should high, given the
bigger sensitivity of output gap to interest rate. But we did not expected that output gap
variance would reduce so sharply when the time horizon of the loss function increased
only from 2 to 3 periods ahead. Table 1 shows that the bigger reduction in relative
variances occurs exactly when the time horizon increases from 2 to 3 periods.
Chart 2 illustrates this point more clearly. Along each line in Chart 2, l is held constant
and the optimization horizon is varying from t+2 to t+8 periods. When l=1, there is a
slight increase in inflation variance is compensated by a substantial reduction in the
variance of output gap, as the optimization horizon moves from t+2 to t+4 periods. In all
cases, though, using more than 6 periods in the loss function is inefficient.
In order to compare the robustness of our model with other rules, we proceeded a test
similar with the one done in Levin, Wieland and Williams (1998). The alternative rules
follow the equation:16
Table 2 shows different values for the coefficients above for alternative rules. Rule A is
the traditional Taylor rule. All other rules preserve the stability condition that the
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Chart 1a shows how these simple rules perform relative to the optimal ones. Actually,
the traditional Taylor rule (A) presents a poor performance. As we increased the weights
on both inflation and output gap variance, the performance improved. Rule C can be
even considered a reasonable alternative (to the optimal) rule if the Central Bank has a
strong bias against inflation variance.
&RQFOXGLQJUHPDUNV
In the IS equation, all the estimated coefficients presented the expected sign. The only
not significant one was the first difference of the real exchange rate.  According to the
Phillips equation, the pass-through from nominal exchange rate depreciation to inflation
(measure by IGP-DI) was approximately 15%. The monetary transmission mechanism
from interest rate to inflation implied that each percentage point increase in real interest
                                                
8 We conducted some simulations using different values for r, but the results were inferior to the ones
presented in this paper.
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rate would provoke a 0.12 p.p. decrease in inflation after two quarters and a 0.6 pp in
the long run.
Regarding the optimal rules, the stochastic simulation showed that when compared to
the variance in inflation, output gap variance is more sensitive to the weights given in
the loss function. This sensitiveness drops sharply when the horizon embodied in the
loss function rises from 2 to 3 periods. In general, the optimal horizons ranged between
2 and 4 periods and optimization procedures longer than 6 quarters were inefficient.
Finally, sub-optimal but simple rules, like Taylor type rules can perform reasonably
well if the Central Bank has a strong bias against inflation variance and if it reacts
more fiercely to the output gap and to deviations of inflation than the traditional
Taylor rule suggests.18
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The Phillips and IS equations (equations x and y) can be written in matrix notation
as:
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where X is the vector of inflation and output gap; Ai are the coefficient matrices;
and E is the error vector.
Through recursive substitution and taking expectations at time t, we find:








































as the expectation taken at time t of the component of inflation at (t + n) that does



















as the coefficient of it+n-2 on expected inflation at (t+n)
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as the expectation taken at time t of the component of output gap at time (t + n) that
does not depend on the interest rate decision at time t.
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as the coefficient of it+n-1 on expected output gap at (t+n)
Therefore:
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where r is the discount factor and l is the weight given to inflation variance in the
loss function.
Needs to assume   it = it+n-1 = it+n-2
Substituting (IV) and (V) into the loss function and solving for the optimal interest
rate, 
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9 Strella and Michkin (data) shows that if model parameters are uncorrelated with interest rate, the
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